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China’s Peacekeeping policies 
in mali:
New Security Thinking or Balancing Europe?
Abstract
In mid-2013, China’s increasingly positive policies towards United Nations peacekeeping 
reached a milestone when the country agreed to send a large detachment of personnel, 
including combat forces for the first time, to the UN Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilisation Mission in Mali (known by its French acronym MINUSMA). This 
commitment was also distinct in that the mission was not in a region which represented 
direct Chinese economic interests, unlike other African peacekeeping missions in which 
Beijing has offered support. Rather, the Mali operation has both cemented Beijing’s 
larger commitment to building African partnerships and has demonstrated a marked 
contrast to the unilateral approach taken by France in pacifying the country. Although 
China has warmed to the principles of humanitarian intervention in civil conflicts, it 
retains a wariness towards peacebuilding operations outside the sponsorship of the 
UN. Therefore, the Mali operation has been beneficial for China, not only in building its 
peacekeeping credentials in Africa but also in underscoring China’s increasingly distinct, 
‘neo-Westphalian’ views on addressing intervention in domestic conflicts.
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1. Introduction: China’s Changed View on Peacekeeping1
Since the People’s Republic of China joined the United Nations in 1971, a significant 
evolution in Beijing’s overall views on UN peacekeeping can be identified in terms of 
a more positive stance on peacekeeping policies, as well as greater openness in the 
consideration of the types of missions in which Beijing would be willing to participate and 
in what capacity. When looking at Chinese policy documents and government papers on 
this subject, one can ascertain a shift in Chinese peacekeeping policy between the Cold 
War and post-Cold War eras, as well as growing confidence towards the development 
of a UN peacekeeping policy within the post-1990s era itself. This has allowed China 
to counteract international impressions that its rising power was becoming a strategic 
threat, and instead permitted the country to craft an identity which included being a 
status-quo power and a friend to developing states. Borrowing from constructivist views 
in international relations theory, peacekeeping has provided an opportunity for Beijing 
to develop a strategic identity based on cooperation to solve modern security issues, 
support for international stability, and the idea that state sovereignty should not be 
breached unless all other options have proven unsuccessful.
Once Beijing began to temper its previous reluctance towards UN peacekeeping and 
agreed to contribute personnel and expanded support for UN missions, there was at first 
a marked preference for sending observers only. One exception was the UN Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992-3, where two separate Chinese engineering 
battalions were deployed, thus becoming China’s first true ‘blue helmets’ in the common 
use of the term. From 1999-2002, Beijing agreed to send civilian police units as liaisons 
to a standing UN mission, namely the operations in East Timor. Since then, China has 
sent both military personnel and civilian policy officials to several disparate UN missions 
in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia and the Caribbean, and by 2009 China had 
overtaken France as the largest supplier of UN peacekeeping personnel within the 
permanent five (P5) members of the UN Security Council.
In March 2014, China had 2,177 UN personnel stationed abroad from approximately 
98,000 in total (Peng et al. 2010; UN, March 2014). Between 2012 and 2013, China also 
substantially increased its share of the UN peacekeeping budget, from 3.9% to 6.6%, 
compared with the United States (28%), the United Kingdom (6.7%) and France (7.2%) 
(UN General Assembly 2013). When the United Nations called for member nations to 
provide personnel and support for a peacekeeping mission to Mali in early 2013, this 
was perceived by the new Chinese government under Xi Jinping as an opportunity for 
Beijing to both broaden and deepen its commitment to the peacekeeping organisation 
as an institution. China’s decision to participate in UN operations in Mali in 2013 should 
therefore be viewed as an important milestone in the ongoing maturation process of 
Beijing’s peacekeeping policy, given the nature of that conflict and the economic and 
diplomatic goods at stake, as well as further potential contributions to China’s image as 
a supporter of security cooperation. In light of increasingly difficult strategic relations 
between China and some of its immediate neighbours including Japan, the Philippines 
 
1 The author would like to thank Olivia Gippner, Mengmeng Huang, Dongkun Li, Garima Mohan, May-
Britt Stumbaum and Jizhou Zhao for their ideas and comments on earlier versions of this working 
paper.
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and Vietnam since 2010, Beijing is very interested in developing a counter-identity to 
that of a revisionist, unsatisfied great power. 
China’s growing and diversified contributions to UN peacekeeping operations have 
become a great source of pride for China’s security establishment and an oft-cited 
example of its commitment to evolving as a great power via the doctrine of ‘peaceful 
development’ (heping fazhan), a doctrine which was put into place at the start of the 
Hu Jintao presidency in 2003. China’s UN commitments were more fully developed in 
order to illustrate the country’s wider foreign policies, cooperative and supportive of 
multilateral operations designed to improve security abroad, but also in a fashion which 
differed from that of the West. These Chinese policies were in keeping with being a 
“responsible great power” (fuzeren de daguo), while gaining further global recognition 
for its alternative models of strategic cooperation (Richardson 2011: 286-7). Often 
termed China’s “New Security Concept” (NSC, xin anquan guan), Beijing has sought to 
promote mutual and equal cooperation in the resolving of security issues rather than 
unrestrained great power intervention (Lampton 2005: 314-5), particularly in developing 
regions. Since the end of the Cold War, China has often expressed criticism of unilateral 
armed intervention, especially by the United States, in civil disputes and humanitarian 
emergencies. This is because Beijing has been apprehensive that such practices were 
thinly-disguised attempts to exert great power policies over weak and developing states, 
and also concerned over the setting of international precedents, given lingering Chinese 
uneasiness about its own territorial integrity, such as in the cases of Taiwan and Tibet. 
During the 1990s and after, Western-backed interventions in the former Yugoslavia, 
Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan and Iraq, (the US-led “coalition of the willing” in 2003-12), as 
well as the NATO-led operations which contributed to the fall of the Muammar Gaddafi 
regime in Libya in August 2011 and Western pressure towards the Assad regime in Syria 
in that conflict, were all greeted by Beijing with various levels of consternation and 
criticism. This placed China’s own post-Cold War security policies in a difficult situation, 
since Beijing was interested in maintaining its support for state sovereignty, a policy 
which has been termed “neo-Westphalianism”, in light of growing unilateral American 
power. However, China was also cognisant of the fact that modern conflicts were not 
falling into the traditional ‘state-versus-state’ patterns which had dominated much of 
the twentieth century, and therefore a more updated international security strategy, 
including the NSC, was required to reconcile these two factors. Since the 1990s, China 
has maintained that interventions in civil disputes, when necessary, must be conducted 
multilaterally and through the UN Security Council (UNSC). However, Beijing has 
become more accepting of multilateral peace operations within states, especially in 
cases of state collapse and when international security is threatened. They acknowledge 
that there are cases where a security problem is too large or complex to be addressed by 
a single state and that at times intervention is required in civil conflicts, especially when 
there is risk of the violence spreading across borders. Nonetheless, China still retains a 
high degree of sensitivity towards the sanctity of state sovereignty under the rubric of 
neo-Westphalianism. 
China’s growing interest in peacekeeping was also tied to its policies under Hu 
Jintao to further global recognition for alternative models of strategic cooperation, a 
process which began with Beijing’s articulation of the NSC based on mutual and equal 
cooperation for the solving of security issues rather than unrestrained intervention by 
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great powers (Lampton 2005: 314-5). The NSC, in its various forms, was a response to 
the rapidly changing global security situation following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, which left the United States as the sole global superpower capable of unilaterally 
addressing security concerns. The NSC was first formally articulated in a 2002 policy 
paper presented to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), stressing the benefits of moving 
beyond the ‘one-sided security’ thinking which was so prevalent in the age of Cold War 
bipolarity. Instead, respect for sovereignty was advocated, especially in the developing 
regions, and the requirement for the United Nations to play a “leading role” in the 
settlement of disputes, preferably through negotiation and reciprocity (PRC Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2002). The development of the NSC doctrine came at a time when 
China began to move away from its blanket condemnation of UN intervention missions 
and instead sought to clarify beneficial versus detrimental means of intervening in civil 
conflicts. The favoured methods included involving the UN Security Council in thorough 
deliberations over how a mission was to proceed and defining the roles of diplomacy 
versus force, while less favoured approaches meant the circumvention of the Security 
Council, usually by a great power and usually namely the United States.
Despite the more favourable stance towards multilateralism expressed in the NSC, 
the idea borrowed heavily on the Cold War-era Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
(heping gongchu wuxiang yuanze), the early Maoist-era doctrine in China which 
advocated state equality and non-discrimination, mutual trust and benefits and non-
interference in states’ sovereign affairs (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000). The Five 
Principles were revived by Beijing in the early 1990s after it became apparent that the 
international system was not yet shifting towards multipolarity with a ‘new international 
order’ favoured by China, but rather greater unipolarity dominated by the United States. 
The ideas which would later form the NSC began to coalesce in the middle of that 
decade and were formally cited by Jiang Zemin in 1999 during the UN Conference on 
Disarmament (Ong 2007: 13). Interpretations of these ideas continued into the current 
century under Hu Jintao, but became more complex as Beijing began to expand its 
diplomacy beyond Asia and into cross-regional policies which, by necessity, prompted 
a greater Chinese role not only in economic partnerships but also in security problems 
further from the country’s periphery, including in Africa, an area in which much of the 
recent Chinese cross-regional diplomacy has been deeply felt.  
The NSC, and subsequent policies on intervention, were also developed during a period 
in the 1990s when Chinese policy began to acknowledge the growing reality that many 
security problems could not be effectively addressed unilaterally, and that cooperation 
was often a more effective method of developing both security and confidence-building. 
By the end of the decade, after demonstrating wariness towards the ideas of ‘human 
security’, namely the enmeshing of human rights issues with security initiatives and 
placing a greater focus on the individual rather than on the state, Beijing began to 
examine this element of security much more closely, although there was a preference 
for the term ‘non-traditional security’ (fei chuantong anquan) in Chinese policy circles 
as opposed to ‘human security’ (Lanteigne 2011: 318). There was a growing recognition 
in Beijing that retaining Cold War-era perceptions of security would result in excessive 
rigidity in light of developing strategic challenges (Evans 2004: 275), including eventually 
the war on terrorism and the destabilising effects of state collapse. ‘Non-traditional’ 
security challenges have thus become embedded in modern Chinese military strategy, 
including in crucial economic regions such as Africa, and since the mid-2000s have 
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played a part in China’s pursuit of increasingly engaging in “long distance manoeuvres” 
(changtu yanxi) (Holslag 2009: 109), including those involving overseas peacekeeping.
China, like many other UN members, was also aware of major side effects of the end 
of the Cold War, namely the unlocking of previously intractable or untouchable civil 
conflicts which had dominated the Cold War as proxy conflicts. Many crises that the 
UN could not previously  approach due to superpower interference, as either one or 
both powers were indirectly involved, could suddenly be openly addressed. This led to 
considerable debate over expanding UN peacekeeping initiatives to achieve the ending 
of civil wars, such as those in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique. These so-
called “orphan” conflicts continued to smoulder despite the withdrawal of superpower 
interest and support, and in the 1990s the number of new peacekeeping missions the 
UN was called upon to undertake increased rapidly (Touval 1994). Adding to these types 
of conflicts were the incidents of collapsed states, which prompted the missions in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Haiti, Rwanda and Somalia. Many of these new missions 
forced a rethinking on China’s part as to how it should respond to and support the 
United Nations’ attempts at peacekeeping and reconstruction in cases where local 
governments were either too weak (or collapsed completely) to provide what Beijing saw 
as necessary consent. This provided an “out” of sorts in terms of Beijing’s adherence to 
the neo-Westphalian idea. If a particular country has lost any sort of central government, 
the issue of state sovereignty becomes more fluid and complex, a situation with which 
Chinese policymakers are more than familiar. China has had extensive experience with 
many episodes of state collapse, including the ancient Warring States Period (Zhangguo 
Shidai) more than two thousand years ago, and more recently the violent Republican era 
(1912-49), which was scarred by warlordism, foreign invasion, and a complete collapse 
of centralised rule.
However, as China’s peacekeeping policy matured and as international security issues 
began to increase in complexity and interconnectedness, there was a growing realisation 
in Beijing that it would have to reconsider its peacekeeping policies to prepare itself 
for more difficult aspects of the international peacebuilding process, including those 
that would challenge China’s traditional views on the sanctity of state sovereignty and 
non-intervention. Moreover, the advent of post-Cold War peacekeeping and the need 
for more “multifunctional” (duogongneng) missions resulted in much internal debate 
within China not only over policy but also whether new broader thinking on Beijing’s 
part was required (Wang 2012). Much of China’s initial peacekeeping policies, it had 
been argued, were dominated by ‘first generation peacekeeping’ (diyidai weihe), echoing 
Cold-War era UN operations with a stronger emphasis on sovereignty, neutrality and 
the pursuit of consent, as opposed to the more multifaceted, Western-backed “robust” 
peacekeeping (qiangli weihe) which appeared after the fall of the bipolar system 
(Tardy 2011; Zhao 2013). China’s growing global diplomatic, strategic and economic 
interests, as well as the country’s increasing acceptance of “responsibility to protect” (or 
R2P, known in Chinese as baohu de zeren) principles, all prompted a revisiting of the 
robust peacekeeping question (Pang 2009; Pang 2012: 54-5; Teitt 2011: 56-70), including 
whether China would be in a position to send combat forces in addition to support and 
engineering personnel. It can be argued, however, that although China has developed 
a greater understanding and appreciation of R2P principles, there is much difference 
of opinion within the country, as within the international community as to how best to 
pursue it. 
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China’s warming towards contributions to UN peacekeeping is one of the most visible 
signs of the country’s greater acceptance of multilateralism in civil conflicts. The widening 
and deepening of Beijing’s UNPKO interests since the late 1990s also contributed much 
to the development of Chinese soft power, meaning attraction rather than coercion, while 
mitigating the perception of a looming “China threat” (Zhongguo weixielun) especially 
in the developing world (Deng 2006: 186-214). Under Hu Jintao, Chinese diplomacy was 
greatly expanded to reach well outside the Asia-Pacific region, including developing 
regions which had traditionally been under the economic and security aegis of the 
United States and Europe, including Africa. Since the Xi government assumed office 
in early 2013, many signs indicated that Beijing was seeking to deepen its developing 
country partnerships, including in Africa. Many of these partnerships have been based 
on increased trade, especially in raw materials considered essential to the continuing 
growth of the Chinese economy. However, this diplomacy has increased the attention 
of Western powers, including the United States and Europe, which are sensitive to the 
possibility of overt diplomatic competition. 
Despite China’s rising power, which stands apart from previous great powers, the 
country has sought to build an identity or “brand” in developing regions. Unlike the 
United States and Western Europe, China could approach developing regions including 
Africa as a former colonised state itself, as well as a country with its own history of 
underdevelopment and instability. In many aspects of Chinese diplomacy in the 
developing world even today, there remain many vestiges of 1990s-era “large developing 
country” (fazhan zhong daguo) thinking which, in the case of its UN peacekeeping policies, 
have served the country’s interests well (Hirono and Lanteigne 2012: 1-14). However, in 
light of China’s increasing power, an argument can be made that the country’s “middle-
power” approach to peacekeeping may prove to be less viable in the future. This would 
have an adverse effect on China’s ability to promote peacekeeping as a key component 
of its strategy and diplomacy. Nonetheless, China continues to make use of its support 
for UN peacekeeping operations not only to advance its strategic agenda but to offer an 
alternative approach to traditional intervention by great powers. 
While Chinese foreign policy continues to incorporate a strong “neo-Westphalian” view 
of sovereignty and the country reacts with caution over intervention in internal disputes, 
Beijing has become more accepting of such interventions under specific conditions, 
including by obtaining as much consent as possible from local governments and other 
actors. Alarm in Beijing over cases of intervention where the UN was bypassed by the 
United States, specifically in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 and the Iraq war after 2003, 
further reinforced China’s views that when international intervention was required, 
the UNSC provided the optimal solution. By the beginning of the new century, China 
was openly supportive of the peacekeeping idea both as a way of prompting peaceful 
multilateral settlement of disputes and as a means to include its armed forces in “Military 
Operations other than War”, or MOOTW (feizhanzheng xing junshi xingdong), including 
humanitarian missions, disaster relief, and increasingly, peacekeeping missions. The 
MOOTW concept was borrowed from American military terminology to refer to non-
combat operations (Gill and Huang 2009: 4; Fravel 2011: 177), and for China these sorts 
of operations provided the opportunity for the country to demonstrate the expansion of 
its military capabilities in a cooperative manner. 
10 | NFG Working Paper No. 11| August 2014 
2. Why did China Participate in Mali Peacekeeping?
The case of Mali, which received a UN peacekeeping detachment in mid-2013 after that 
country’s devastating civil war came to an uncertain close in the wake of a unilateral 
armed intervention by France to protect its former colonial holding, has proven to be a 
crucial test of Chinese commitments to peace operations. First, the Mali mission marked 
the first time in its history that China agreed to send combat forces to a UN mission, as 
previously Beijing preferred to restrict its contributions of personnel to civilian police, 
normally drawn from civilian units and the People’s Armed Police (PAP), and combat 
engineers as well as other support staff. The one exception was a small detachment 
of combat forces sent to guard Chinese engineering and medical staff operating in 
South Sudan in 2012 (Xinhua, 24 February 2012). Since Beijing’s turn towards greater 
participation in peacekeeping missions in the late 1990s, internal debates had persisted 
over whether the country was in a position politically to send military units as part 
of certain missions. Until the Mali mission, Beijing had been greatly sensitive to any 
international views that saw it seeking to interfere unilaterally in internal conflicts, 
especially in the developing world where China has been most active in its identity-
building exercises. 
Second, unlike in other parts of Africa where Chinese peacekeeping personnel had been 
committed, Mali was not a major economic partner for China and does not have an 
extensive resource base which Beijing would openly seek to co-develop. Other African 
UN missions to which China also provided personnel, most notably in Sudan and South 
Sudan, did involve crucial regional economic partners for Beijing in light of the fossil fuels 
in the region. However, the Mali mission did play a part in China’s wider engagement of 
Africa which had developed under the Hu government and looked to accelerate under 
Xi Jinping. As well, Mali had played a role in China’s expanding African diplomacy after 
the turn of the century. For example, Malian leaders had visited China four times in 
2004-10, and President Hu toured Mali in 2009 as part of his government’s enhanced 
African diplomatic policies (Shinn 2003; Xinhua 12 February 2009). Both the Hu and Xi 
governments have sought to engage Africa on a regional scale through a variety of means. 
In 2010, South Africa was added to the group of ‘BRICS’ large developing economies, 
in which China plays a major role. Shortly after taking office, President Xi visited the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Africa and Tanzania in March 2013, and in May 
2014, Premier Li Keqiang made state visits to Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria (China 
Daily 18 March 2013; Pei 2014). Malian diplomacy, therefore, can be viewed within the 
larger idea of China’s cross-regional diplomacy and positive identity-building with the 
whole of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Third, China’s swift pledge of between five and six hundred personnel to the Mali operation 
(Witcher 2013), an unprecedented number for the country, demonstrated not only a 
firm commitment but also a more efficient decision-making process within the Chinese 
government in response to new UN missions. In November 2013, it was announced 
by the Chinese government that its contingent of about 395 peacekeeping personnel 
had completed training protocols and was ready for deployment. The bulk of the forces 
would be charged with the repair of critical infrastructure and facilities, as well as acting 
as security guards. Medical personnel would also form part of the contribution. The 
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strategic component of the force would be drawn from the 16th Combined Corps of the 
Shenyang Military Area Command (MAC) of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (People’s 
Daily, 20 November 2013). The first two contingents of Chinese peacekeepers, totalling 
almost four hundred personnel, were on the ground in Mali by January 2014 (SCMP / 
AFP, 17 January 2014). However, although the Chinese government did make mention of 
the added security component to its contribution to the Mali operation, this was done in 
a muted fashion in an attempt to play down that aspect of its participation in the hopes 
of deflecting international criticism of perceived Chinese military expansion. The fact 
that UN peacekeeping operations in Mali were designed to protect a regime rather than 
to undermine or depose one was also a factor in China’s decision to participate, as well 
as to include a security force component (Murray 2013). Related to this idea was the fact 
that the adversaries in Mali were largely religious extremists seeking to dismember a 
sovereign state through force, an issue to which Beijing could relate given the ongoing 
problems in China’s far-Western region of Xinjiang since the rioting there in July 2009 
and subsequent terrorist incidents in Kunming, Urumqi and Guangzhou in early 2014 
which were blamed on Xinjiang Islamic extremists (Jacobs and Buckley 2014; Kalman 
2014). 
Finally, the Mali operations offered China an opportunity to tacitly challenge traditional 
European approaches to peace operations in the developing world, especially in the case 
of former colonies. China’s security presence on the international level has grown to 
the point where Beijing is now much more comfortable entering debates over strategic 
affairs even in regions well outside of the Pacific Rim, as evidenced for example by 
differing Chinese and Western views on Middle East affairs including the post-2012 
Syrian Civil War, as well as the Ukraine/Crimea crises in early 2014. In both of these cases, 
Chinese views of neo-Westphalianism did assert themselves, especially out of concern 
that Western actors were using the crises to promote unilateral regime change. In Mali, 
an opportunity was provided for China to contrast its peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
policies with that of France, Mali’s previous colonial administrator, and the greater West, 
suggesting that Beijing is becoming increasingly willing to put forward alternative 
models and approaches for peacebuilding following civil conflicts. By doing so, China 
also hopes to avoid developing the identity of a “spoiler”, despite its disagreements with 
European and Western powers over approaches to civil conflicts. 
3. The Trials of Mali
China’s attempts to juggle both its suspicions of Western interventionist policies and its 
own expanding economic diplomacy in the developing world were greatly challenged by 
events in West Africa in late 2012 and early 2013. The western African state of Mali first 
drew the attention of the United Nations as a result of a growing separatist movement 
in the poor and desolate northeastern part of the country. Before independence in 1960, 
Mali was part of French West Africa, and it remains one of the poorest nations in the 
region with a per capita GDP of only US$1100 and an economy based on agriculture, 
primarily cotton, and gold mining. The landlocked country’s sparse population, about 
16 million, is largely based in the country’s south and especially within the capital of 
Bamako. The country’s location, surrounded by conflicts and instability in Algeria, Chad, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Niger, as well as the aftershocks of the post-2010 “Arab Spring” 
12 | NFG Working Paper No. 11| August 2014 
uprisings across North Africa and Southwest Asia, has left the state highly vulnerable to 
the overspill from nearby security crises. 
One of these recent conflicts, the 2011 civil war in Libya which resulted in the ousting 
of majority leader Muammar Gaddafi, was widely seen as the main catalyst of greater 
instability in West Africa. Insurgents and extremists involved in that conflict began to 
base operations in the desolate regions of northern Mali, along with weapons looted 
from the fighting, in the hopes of creating a more permanent redoubt in the desolate 
Sahel expanse which flanks the Sahara Desert. Worse for Mali, the Gaddafi regime 
had been a major economic supporter of the country and a stabilizing force along the 
northern Malian borders. 
Mali had a history of political instability since its independence, including a failed 
federation with neighbouring Senegal and a military government which was only defeated 
in 1992, ushering in a decade of democratic experimentation which nonetheless failed to 
address the country’s North-South divide (Hisbourg, 2013). By early 2012, local militants 
sought to create a separate state of Azawad, forcibly carved out of the Malian northern 
desert regions, and drew support from Tuareg (Berber) nomads in the territory who 
had been largely disenfranchised, socially and economically, from the more prosperous 
South and the central government in Bamako. Traditionally, Tuareg rebels had staged 
uprisings, both during the colonial era and after Malian independence, with the goal 
of gaining greater political power. However, the influx of weapons and extremist fervor 
from Libya and other Arab Spring revolts shifted the rebels’ focus to separatism rather 
than forced regime change. 
What would otherwise have been a relatively limited insurgency soon became an 
international concern when the separatists joined with a second coalition of extremists, 
headed by the Ansar Dine (or Ansar al-Din, ‘Defenders of the Faith’) and backed by Al-
Qaïda au Maghreb islamique / Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a subsidiary of 
the Al-Qaeda network. The Ansar Dine had been a longstanding opponent of the Malian 
government, as well as of the Sufi religious minority in the country, and a supporter of 
Tuareg independence as well as the implementation of strict traditional Shari’a law across 
Mali. The AQIM, primarily based in Algeria, acted as Al-Qaeda’s main arm in North Africa 
since its organization was formalized in 2007, and had been involved in northern Mali 
to a minor degree since the late 1990s with tacit acceptance by the Malian government. 
An AQIM splinter group, al-Mulathamin (“the Masked Ones”) also established itself in 
northern Mali (Shaw, 2013: 202; Black, 2013; Bøås and Torheim, 2013: 1281). Two other 
Islamic fundamentalist groups, Le Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de 
l’Ouest (‘Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa’ or MOJWA) and Boko Haram, 
operating out of northern Nigeria, further destabilized the northern part of the country 
and began to capture towns throughout the region while flush with smuggled arms and 
trained militants both from Mali and from the nearby Libyan conflict in a classic “ink 
stain” scenario (Shaw 2013: 205; Zajec 2013: 1). 
In April 2012, the rebels captured the ancient city of Timbuktu (Tombouctou), threatening 
ancient texts and other historical relics in the centuries-old settlement, and by January 
2013 the strategic town of Konna, only seven hundred kilometres from Bamako, was also 
taken, thus illustrating the increasing vulnerability of the central government given that 
the capital was then within easy striking distance of rebel forces (France 24/AP 2013; Zajec 
2013: 1). Those cities captured by the extremists were also forced to abide by Shari’a law. 
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The civilian government began to be viewed as incapable of adequately addressing the 
conflict and more concerned with regime stability than with supporting and equipping 
Malian soldiers on the front lines of the rebellion. As a result, the country fell further into 
anarchy in March 2012 when a military coup ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré, 
over the civilian government’s perceived mishandling of the northern crisis (Lecocq et 
al., 2013: 346-7), as it had become more obvious that the country could not battle the 
insurgents without outside assistance. Rather than strengthen the resolve of the Malian 
armed forces, the coup actually weakened it further, resulting in mutinies and further 
disorder which enabled the rebel groups to gain still more territory. The traditional 
international view of Mali as a developing state with strong democratic foundations was 
irrevocably shattered as governance in the country quickly unraveled due to the crisis. 
The interim military government fronted by the military junta’s National Committee for 
the Rectification of Democracy and the Restoration of the State (CNRDRE), and headed 
by Dioncounda Traoré, requested French military assistance in early January 2013 as the 
security situation continued to worsen and it became apparent that, despite concerns in 
North Africa over Mali’s deepening crisis, regional security mechanisms lacked both the 
coordination and the resolve to respond themselves. A tepid report on Mali released in 
2012 by the UN Secretary General, as well as two UN Security Council resolutions which 
essentially placed the onus of solving the crisis on the fractured Malian government, 
also raised concerns that the UN was not in a position to respond effectively to calls for 
outside intervention (Lecocq et al., 2013: 355; UNSC S/2012/894). 
The Mali crisis was also a test for European Union foreign policymaking, but, like the 
UN initially, there was little in the way of a coordinated response to the rebellion despite 
improvements in joint EU international relations in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, which 
became active in 2009 and was designed to better coordinate a joint European Union 
foreign policymaking structure. In regards to northern Africa and its stability, the EU 
had published a set of guidelines for improving security and development in the Sahel 
region in March 2011 (European External Action Service, 2011). Among the points raised 
were that the Sahel should be treated as a distinct region in Africa and that organisations 
should be encouraged to promote joint security cooperation and problem-solving, in 
addition to the need to address hostile actors such as the AQIM. The report also praised 
the actions of the Touré government for establishing the Programme spécial pour la 
paix, la sécurité et le développement dans le nord du Mali (‘Special Programme for Peace, 
Security and Development in Northern Mali’, PSPSDN) in 2011 (Thiam, 2011; EU, 2011). 
Neither the PSPSDN initiative nor EU support, however, was anywhere near enough to 
forestall the chaos which would begin in 2012. After the coup, the Union condemned 
the Malian military’s actions but welcomed the appointment of Dioncounda Traoré as 
the next president. The EU was unwilling, however, to call for a joint European military 
response to the conflict, limiting its support to calling for military training in Mali, and 
thus France was facing pressure to respond unilaterally (Cristiani and Fabiani 2013:13-5).
In the face of this uncertainty, the government of François Hollande responded in 
January 2013 by controversially reversing its decree of the previous October that France’s 
support for the Malian government would be restricted to material shipments only 
(Wing 2013: 483; Zajec 2013: 1). During an October 2012 speech to the parliament in 
Dakar, Senegal, Hollande sought to assure regional leaders that France was moving 
away from its traditional “big brother” role which marked the colonial and immediate 
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post-1960 postcolonial eras in Africa. “The age of what was once called ‘Françafrique’ is 
over. There’s France and there’s Africa. There’s the partnership between France and Africa, 
with relations based on respect, clarity and solidarity” (France Diplomatie 2012). Yet, with 
the announcement that France would go it alone in pushing back the extremist forces 
in Mali, or at least with African allies and without Western ones, it was demonstrated 
that French paternalism in Africa could not be consigned to history so quickly. Indeed, 
with the Mali and subsequent Central African Republic conflicts, France’s Africa strategic 
policy appeared to be experiencing a renaissance. 
France’s decision to commit its military forces to Opération Serval in Mali was not only 
a test of international responses to humanitarian crises but also of Beijing’s evolving 
views on intervention. As Islamist forces continued to threaten the capital, the United 
Nations authorized the intervention of French and African troops under ECOWAS (The 
Economic Community of West African States) to push the rebels back during the first 
half of 2013, recapturing all key towns in the North by the end of January (Polgreen 
and Savare 2013). France’s swift actions in Mali also stood in contrast to those of the 
United States, which refrained from promising any armed support for peace operations 
as well as taking a somewhat more centrist stance between the military government and 
the rebels, condemning terrorist activities but not throwing Washington’s full support 
behind the military government either (Primo 2013). This encouraged France to take 
the lead in pushing back what may have been a direct threat to the stability of Mali as a 
whole. 
A tentative peace agreement between Bamako and the Tuareg rebels was signed in June 
2013, with an election successfully held in July 2013 (WP 2013), but the North remains 
unstable despite the presence of foreign forces in the country, due to occasional attacks by 
AQIM loyalists. As the peace deal was struck, the UN authorized the formation of the UN 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Mission multidimensionnelle 
intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali or MINUSMA). The operation’s 
mandate included the re-establishment of Malian state authority throughout the country, 
as well as the protection of civilians and historical sites. The mission was authorized after 
the successful April 2013 passing of UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013), which 
referred to the January rebel attacks as terrorist acts and authorized as many as 11,200 
personnel to be dispatched to Mali under the UN banner (UN-MINUSMA, 2013). France, 
however, would remain at the forefront of peace operations, and in October 2013 a major 
offensive named Operation Hydra (Opération Hydre) involving French, Malian and UN 
forces took place in the ‘Niger Loop’ region between Timbuktu and the northern Malian 
city of Gao as a response to ongoing insurgent attacks (Guibert 2013; Al-Jazeera, 24 
October 2013). As a result of ongoing violence in the northern town of Kidal, still held 
by rebel forces, the MNLA announced in late November 2013 that it was ending the 
cease-fire put into place five months previously and promised to renew attacks against 
the Malian army, further complicating peace operations (Al-Jazeera, 30 November 2013). 
At stake for international actors was not only the continued pacification of Mali but also 
the stabilization of the greater West African region. 
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4. Conclusion: China, France, and the Future of Mali
What has made the Mali case a watershed for China’s peacekeeping policies, in addition 
to the commitment by Chinese personnel to resolve what has largely been an internal 
conflict, is that the West African country is very close to China’s extensive African eco-
nomic interests. Mali has itself been a source of Chinese trade, albeit not on the same 
level as other parts of the continent which have provided Beijing trade in fossil fuels 
and more valuable raw materials. Beijing’s primary diplomatic partners on the conti-
nent have been those states with much larger resource endowments, including Algeria, 
Angola, South Africa, Sudan and Zambia. China’s trade with Africa surpassed American 
and European levels in 2009, and as of 2011 stood at US$160 billion, while Chinese trade 
with Mali stood at US$622 million in December 2012 compared to US$280 million two 
years previously. China had become Mali’s largest bilateral trading partner by the start of 
the civil conflict (Xinhua November 2013; Qin 2013; Shinh 2013). 
In addition, before the informal diplomatic “truce” between Beijing and Taipei estab-
lished after 2008, Africa was also a primary arena for diplomatic competition over rec-
ognition. While the establishment of the truce has cooled this competition, the decision 
by the government of Gambia to drop its relations with Taiwan underscored how fragile 
the arrangement was (Shih 2013). However, competition with Taipei was not an issue 
in terms of Chinese relations with Mali, as the African state recognized Beijing shortly 
after Malian independence in 1960, with no disruptions to the present day. Nonetheless, 
China has remained sensitive to the idea that it is engaging in economic and diplomatic 
competition with the United States and Europe, and has drawn a distinction between its 
trade initiatives on the continent and the region’s ongoing security problems. During 
his March 2013 African tour, Xi Jinping stressed in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that China 
was poised to be an important economic power for the continent while avoiding the 
nationalism and hegemonism previously practiced by European great powers in Africa 
(Buckley 2013). 
The Chinese government’s initial response to France’s decision to send forces to protect 
the Malian government and to roll back territorial gains from the extremists was reserved, 
although Beijing’s views were well short of open criticism of French actions given the 
difficult circumstances in Mali. In the first official statement by the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry after operations began, the question of France’s role was sidestepped. Instead, 
the spokesperson condemned attacks by the rebel forces and confirmed its support for 
the Malian government without commenting on the actions by the French. As well, there 
was a call for an African regional-based support operation to be implemented at the earli-
est convenience (PRC Foreign Ministry, January 2013), in keeping with common Chinese 
government preferences for regional crises to be addressed by local actors whenever 
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possible. These statements reflected the Chinese government’s discomfort over support 
for what was then a largely unilateral, French-led operation within one of its former co-
lonial holdings. 
After the French operations began, some international concerns were expressed that 
Beijing was seeking to “free-ride” on France’s actions, similar to China’s benefits from the 
war in Afghanistan which allowed for deeper Chinese investment there. China’s economic 
interests in Mali were adversely affected by the fighting, since before the conflict it was 
estimated that approximately one third of Mali’s total exports, including cotton and gold, 
totaling about €100 million (US$130 million) annually, were going to Beijing (Jolis 2013). 
Nonetheless, the idea that China was indirectly benefitting from French-led intervention 
in Mali was greeted by the Chinese press with much skepticism, with one editorial noting 
that Beijing’s tacit support for the Libya intervention cost China a considerable amount 
in lost contracts from the Gaddafi years. At the same time, one Chinese newspaper ed-
itorial noted that it was the United States, not China, that had augmented its military 
presence in Africa with the establishment of the US African Command (AFRICOM) in 
2007, suggesting a double standard at work (Sun 2013; BBC Monitoring / Factiva 2013). 
Moreover, as some Chinese Africa analysts have noted, France’s intervention placed it 
in a much stronger diplomatic position vis-à-vis both China and the United States, the 
latter country itself having not opted for intervention. It was also argued in one Chinese 
newspaper editorial that the decision to intervene by the Hollande government not only 
risked the same quagmire that the US encountered in Afghanistan, but also created the 
possibility of the “legalization of a new interventionism in Africa”, an unwelcome prece-
dent in Beijing’s view. As well, the article noted that “France’s involvement in Mali is still a 
risky business. One of the drawbacks of this action is that it brings back memories of the 
‘African gendarmerie’”(He 2013). Another editorial in the same news agency published 
by two specialists from the Chinese Naval Research Institute noted that the West as a 
whole was seeking a stronger strategic presence in Africa, and also suggested that France 
might have had economic motives in intervening in Mali. The piece concluded by saying 
that the Chinese government should not send troops or financial support to Mali under 
the circumstances, a recommendation which Beijing ultimately did not follow (Li and 
Jin 2013). Although the suggested quagmire scenario did not become a reality, Beijing 
nonetheless appeared to see France’s response to the worsening conflict in Mali as too 
unilateral and too contradictory to the development of a lasting peace in the region. 
Most recently, China has also used the Mali intervention to return to its earlier diplomatic 
stances which equate state instability with economic underdevelopment. As one editorial 
in the China Daily noted (Gosset 2013), while France’s actions worked to prevent the 
brand of radical extremism from spreading across the Sahel region in northern Africa, 
the real problem was that the widespread poverty in Mali and the surrounding region 
needed to be addressed better in order to prevent such extremist groups from returning 
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to the region (Yu 2013). Even before France had launched Opération Serval, Chinese gov-
ernment officials had regarded the worsening situation in the Sahel region as a product 
of underdevelopment and diplomatic failures. In a December 2012 speech at the UNSC, 
Ambassador Li Baodong stressed that the solution for Mali and the surrounding region 
was not only improved international coordination of aid and assistance but also the 
requirement that regional governments and actors take the lead in peacebuilding (China 
UN Mission December 2012). Once the MINUSMA mission was confirmed, Beijing took 
the initiative to contribute security forces for the first time along with engineers and 
support staff, with training for the mission being carried out during the middle of 2013 
(Xinhua / BBC Monitoring June 2013). Given its lack of experience in the region, Chinese 
forces will, as before, need to coordinate with the UN, other peacekeeping actors, and 
local governments. 
The “Mali effect” has also influenced other aspects of China’s peacekeeping policy in Africa. 
In March 2013, Beijing offered its support for a UN “offensive brigade” to be deployed to 
Congo-Kinshasa as a core component of the post-2010 UN Organization Stabilisation 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), to directly confront and dis-
arm rebel groups operating near borders with Rwanda and Uganda. Such a unit, contrary 
to previous UN peacekeeping protocols regarding rules of engagement, would be able 
to use force without necessarily being fired upon first, in the name of protecting civilians 
and other humanitarian actors in support of the Congolese government (MONUSCO 
2013). Despite the nature of the mission, Beijing representatives noted that such mea-
sures were necessary given the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Congo due 
to repeated attacks on civilians by rebels affiliated with the Mouvement du 23-Mars / 
“March 23 Movement” (M23) and other militias operating in central Africa. Although the 
conflict in Congo has largely remained local, the central location of the country meant 
that instability there was having a detrimental effect on security in the whole of the 
African Great Lakes region. In giving its support for the Congo operations, Beijing called 
upon the UN force to maintain impartiality and stated that this mission should not be 
considered as setting a precedent (Xinhua, 29 March 2013; Al-Jazeera, 29 March 2013; 
Smith 2012). Also, in a similar vein as the Mali mission, Beijing was acting in support 
of a standing government rather than against it. Therefore, China could still adjust its 
previous policies towards armed intervention while remaining faithful to the concept of 
sovereignty and neo-Westphalian principles. At the same time, Beijing could continue to 
build its strategic “brand” based on support for peacebuilding, counter-terrorism, and 
multilateralism in resolving international crises. 
China’s decision to support the formation of an offensive unit under the United Nations 
further suggested that Beijing was becoming more comfortable with UN combat mis-
sions under certain situations and in select regions. As with the Mali mission, China has 
been seeking to improve diplomatic ties by supporting regional security initiatives with 
Africa given its expanding economic interests on the continent and potential competi-
tion with established powers including France. In the wake of military successes in Mali 
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and the subsequent bolstering of African public opinion towards French foreign policy 
on the continent, the Hollande government appeared poised to develop a new form of 
bilateral security diplomacy, thus de facto reviving the ‘Françafrique’ idea, only on more 
equitable terms for African governments.
For France, the Mali mission changed the perception in Africa of French intervention 
taking place only to serve French interests or to prop up client governments and instead 
acted to underscore France’s commitment to addressing increasingly difficult and inter-
connected security problems in the region (Haski 2013). As well, France appeared ready 
to take on new security challenges in Africa, as illustrated by the Hollande government’s 
call for more French forces to intervene in the Central African Republic (CAR), which 
at the end of 2013 was facing internal sectarian violence and the distinct possibility of 
state collapse. During November of that year, China’s Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, Liu Jieyi, also noted the faltering security situation in the CAR within 
the greater question of security in Central Africa, including the ongoing threat from the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, and called for increased international attention 
and dialogue (Ni 2013). Finally, in May 2014, the Nigeria-based Islamic militant group 
Boko Haram attacked a Chinese factory in neighbouring Cameroon, kidnapping ten 
Chinese nationals (Tumanjong, 2014). This underscored the fact that Chinese economic 
interests in central Africa were increasingly being viewed as legitimate targets by extrem-
ist organisations. 
In light of China’s participation in the Mali mission and growing overall interest in central 
African security in Beijing, the question is whether the stage was being set for more pro-
nounced diplomatic and perhaps even strategic interactions between Europe, especially 
France, and China on the continent. As China continues to rethink its traditional policies 
towards humanitarian intervention, Mali has demonstrated that a new variable has been 
added, namely that several trouble spots in the world are becoming either part of or 
close to Beijing’s expanding network of trade and aid partners. In May 2013, as Beijing 
was preparing its response to the development of a UN mission to Mali, a spokesperson 
for the Chinese Foreign Ministry noted that his country was ready to build a more visible 
presence in Africa “as a responsible major power with a more neutral stance in the field,” 
(Zhao 2013). Therefore, Beijing cannot as readily play the bystander, or the balancer, in 
future cases of civil conflict and intervention debates to the degree with which it had 
previously been sanguine. China’s decision to support the more robust peacekeeping 
role for Mali suggested that Beijing was becoming more comfortable with UN combat 
missions under certain situations and in select regions including Africa. As well, Beijing 
has been seeking to develop a more positive strategic identity by maintaining strong dip-
lomatic ties with Africa given its expanding economic interests on the continent, while 
demonstrating that previous unilateral forms of intervention as spearheaded by the West, 
including France, were neither the only nor the best option. As Western Africa, especially 
the Sahel region, will continue to remain vulnerable to weak governments and non-state 
threats in the form of Islamic extremism, it is in the interests of both France and the West 
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to coordinate policy further with China, given the latter’s increased interest in promoting 
African peace and stability.
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